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ABSTRACT
The accelerated introduction of information and communications technology into the economy
has created numerous challenges for policymakers. This paper describes this New Economy and then
proceeds to examine difficulties created for policymakers. The increased flexibility of the new economy
argues against trying to use fiscal policy for stabilization and creates both immediate and long-term
difficulties for monetary policy. Immediate difficulties concern the problems associated with estimating
potential output when the productivity trend is shifting. During periods of transition, it is extremely
difficult to distinguish permanent from transitory shifts in output growth, and adjust policy correctly. In
the long-term, central banks must face the prospect of a significant decline in the demand for their
liabilities, and a resulting loss of their primary interest rate policy instrument. The disappearance of the










“In the new economy, many of the old classical rules of economics no 
longer apply; over the years, the U.S. has made and learned new rules all 
its own.”  Time Magazine, December 31, 1958. 
 
1. Introduction 
  The new economy poses many old challenges.  Computers and the internet have 
reduced the cost of providing and obtaining information, but so did telephones and 
televisions 50 years ago.  The difficulties of integrating new technology into the 
production of goods and services may be somewhat less than in the past, but the upheaval 
caused by it does not seem qualitatively different from what we have seen since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution.
1  There are surely many difficult challenges, but 
they are not new. 
 
  For macroeconomic policy the story is similar. The goal of macroeconomic policy 
is to assure high and stable growth with low and stable inflation. The details of how to do 
this remain illusive. The job of fiscal and monetary policy makers has always been 
complex, and it is surely not getting any easier.  But again, this is not new. Economists 
continue to argue about the potential for government tax and expenditure policies to 
stabilize the economy, and the decades-long debate over the exact nature of the monetary 
transmission mechanism continues. It is as impossible now to give detailed advice to 
policymakers about when and by how much to adjust their instruments as it was 30 years 
ago. 
 
  Monetary and fiscal policies share the job of economic management.  Unlike most 
government actions, interest rates can be changed literally overnight.   By contrast, 
changing tax and expenditure policies usually means legislative action, making it very 
slow.  Monetary policy is a much better stabilization tool, while fiscal policy should 
focus on building solid foundations for long-term growth.  The fact that today’s economy 
is more nimble in responding to shocks places these roles into even starker relief than 
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they were a decade ago. Ensuring short-term economic stability in today’s world is the 
job of the central bank, and that is where I will focus my attention. 
 
  Ever-faster computers and telecommunications equipment have created new 
challenges for central bankers. Most importantly, the economy has become naturally 
more resilient over the past decade.  We have seen important changes in the structure of 
goods, labor and financial markets.  As the economy has become more nimble in 
adjusting to external shocks, policymakers must become more agile in their reactions.   
The central bankers’ job has become more difficult, since they need to recognize risks 
and act more quickly, but at the same time, the costs of inaction may have gone down, as 
the economy seems to heal itself more rapidly.   
 
  Even in the new economy, the primary challenges facing monetary policymakers 
in their daily work are the same as they have ever been.  Stabilizing prices means 
forecasting inflation, which requires estimates of the sustainable, or potential, growth rate 
of the economy.  As if this isn’t a sufficiently daunting task, central bankers would be 
helpless without some idea of how changes in their interest rate instrument will alter the 
path of future output and inflation.   
 
  Difficulties in estimating potential GDP growth have been with us since the 
concept was first introduced more than 40 years ago.  Over the years, trend productivity 
growth has undergone occasional periods of transition when estimating future potential 
output has been very difficult.  In the U.S., we entered such a period in the middle 1990s, 
and things have not stabilized yet. For policymakers, the problem is that it takes time to 
realize that the trend rate of growth has shifted.  Charts 1 and 2, which plot real GDP 
growth and output per hour for the U.S. from 1980 to 2001, make this point abundantly 
clear.  It is nearly impossible to tell even in hindsight that the growth rate in potential 
GDP rose markedly in the mid-1990s. 
 
The recent change in the productivity growth rate is not unprecedented.   The 
increase in the sustainable growth rate of the American economy is in many ways just the Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 2 
mirror image of the slowdown that came in the mid-1970s.  Then, the sustainable growth 
rate of the American economy fell from roughly 4% to a level closer to 2½%.  Coming at 
a time of substantial domestic and international turbulence, it took several years to realize 
that the change had occurred.   
 
Beyond the difficulties created by shifts in the sustainable growth rate of the 
economy, the structural underpinnings of the economy are constantly evolving.  Over the 
1990s we can point to three very important, and probably lasting, changes.  Technology 
has been used to make production more responsive to changes in product demand, 
thereby reducing the level of inventories.  The growth in the proportion of workers hired 
on a temporary basis had given companies the ability to adjust the size of their workforce 
rapidly in response to changing business conditions.  And finally, innovations in finance 
have helped to assure that companies and consumers have access to resources even when 
times are tough. 
 
The evolution of the financial system poses a particularly difficult challenge for 
central bankers. Since monetary policy acts initially through its impact on the balance 
sheets of financial firms, the explosion of asset-backed securities has likely changed the 
mechanism by which interest rate changes affect the real economy. As more borrowers 
have access to primary capital markets, and fewer need banks, it may become more 
difficult for the actions of central bankers to alter the future path of output and inflation. 
 
Reduced demand for cash and reserves, the primary liabilities issued by the 
central bank, poses a second challenge to central bankers. But again, this problem is not 
new.  The metamorphosis of the financial system has been ongoing for decades, if not 
centuries.  And, as a result, the changes in the monetary transmission mechanism have 
been continuous.  One clear sign of this is the constant attempts to broaden the set of 
financial instruments that are included in a given monetary aggregate, in the belief that 
the liquidity of the new instruments are somehow equivalent to that of those that were in 
the previous definition.  But the connection between the elements of the central bank Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 3 
balance sheet and the monetary aggregate has never been that tight anyway, and so it is 
difficult mourn the further decline in their usefulness as policy guides.   
 
What is new is the widespread belief that the rate of change in the financial 
system has somehow increased, and so the end game, where demand for cash and 
reserves have dropped to zero, may be fast approaching.  My own view is that the 
difficulties this poses for central bankers are still several decades off.
2  
 
In the remainder of this essay, I will discuss both short- and long-term challenges 
that the evolution of the macroeconomic structure poses for fiscal and monetary policy.  
In Section II, I present evidence of the changes wrought over the past decade or so.  I 
focus first on the reduced cyclical volatility of U.S. growth, then on the increase in the 
level of average growth, and finally on the sources of the low inflation of the last half of 
the 1990s.  Section III discusses the implications of these changes for fiscal and monetary 
policy.  In the final section, I provide some comments on my views on how information 
technology will transform policy in the longer run. 
  
2.  Elements of the “New” Economy 
 
The United States economy has evolved significantly from what it was just twenty 
years ago. Today, information technology is everywhere. Once the preserve of scientific 
laboratories and the back offices of financial institutions, today semiconductors are 
buried inside home appliances and automobiles. Computer chips control everything from 
elevators to airplane traffic.   
 
  The internet, initiated several decades ago by the United States Department of 
Defense in an effort to link research universities together, has now grown into an 
important part of domestic and international commerce.  I no longer have to leave my 
                                                 
2 This topic has been the subject of heated debate over the past few years.  The papers on "The Future of 
Monetary Policy" by Charles A.E. Goodhart, Michael Woodford, Charles Freedman and Benjamin 
Freedman that have appeared in the July 2000 issue of the journal International Finance provide a 
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desk to shop for and purchase books, clothes, furniture, or virtually anything else.  It is 
even simple to order wine, cheese and chocolate by clicking.  Not only that, but I can 
place my order 24 hours a day, 7 days a week while sitting in my home wearing nothing 
but my underwear. This is all truly revolutionary. 
 
  As computers became both ubiquitous and increasingly powerful, two things 
happened.  First, in the mid-1980s, the volatility of U.S. GDP growth declined, and then, 
in 1995, the level of growth rose.  Along with this came a marked fall in average 
inflation.  The goal of this section is to describe these changes and speculate about their 
sources. 
 
2.1 A More Stable Economy 
 
  Using sophisticated statistical procedures, Margaret Mary McConnell and Gabriel 
Perez Quiros (2000) establish that what our eyes suggest is in Chart 1 is really there.  
They show that growth has been markedly less volatile since 1984 than it was in the 
preceding 25 years.   
 
McConnell and Perez Quiros attribute the fall in aggregate volatility to a change 
in the inventory behavior of durable goods manufacturers.  In the past, unintended shifts 
in inventory levels have been blamed for a significant part of business-cycle fluctuations. 
When demand fell, manufacturers would find themselves with substantial unsold stock 
and be forced to cut back on production, reducing employment and leading to an overall 
economic downturn.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, the inventory to sales ratio of these 
manufacturers began to decline, and it continued to decline steadily through the 1990s.  
Chart 3 tracks the fall for the goods producing sector from an average of 2.1 prior to 1984 
to a level of 1.54 by the end of 2001. (These figures can be interpreted as number of 
quarters supply on hand.) Technology has enabled companies to keep better track of 
production and sales, speeding the rate at which they are able to response to changes in 
demand.  Techniques like just-in-time inventory control policies have reduced the 
amplitude of inventory fluctuations and stabilized overall economic activity. Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 5 
 
  The general resilience and stability of the U.S. economy is nowhere more 
apparent than in the 2000-2001 episode.  This mini-recession, with a peak to trough GDP 
decline of less than one-quarter of one percent, clearly demonstrates the new recuperative 
powers of the U.S. economy. Moreover, Chart 3 suggests that inventory policy played an 
important role. This is the only recession during which the inventory-to-sales ratio has 
fallen.   
 
The change in inventory control policies is only one of several things contributing 
to the speedy recovery from the 2001 downturn.   Changes in labor and financial markets 
also played a role in increasing the flexibility of the U.S. economy.  On the employment 
side, there has been a dramatic shift toward temporary help over the past decade.  Chart 4 
shows that the proportion of employees from temporary help agencies increased from 
½% of total nonfarm employment in 1983 to over 2½% by 2000. At its peak in 
September 2001 over 3½ million workers were temporary.   Not only that, but over the 
subsequent 16 months, the fall in temporary help accounted for 70% of the nonfarm 
employment decline of 951,000 workers.  The recession was concentrated to an 
extraordinary degree in this most flexible portion of the labor force, leaving “permanent” 
employees in their jobs. 
 
Turning to financial markets, we have seen significant innovation over the past 
decade as well.  Once upon a time there were two sources for borrowing: direct debt 
issuance and bank borrowing.  Most firms and households cannot issue marketable debt, 
and so were dependent on banks for financing.  Beginning with the creation of mortgage-
backed securities in the early 1970s, things started to change. Today the list of asset-
backed securities now includes home mortgages, car loans, credit card debt, student 
loans, equipment leases, movie box-office receipts, and even the future revenues from 
British pubs.   
 
  Chart 5 plots total asset-backed securities (from both private and government 
issuers) as a percentage of debt that was typically issued by the banking system (this Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 6 
includes loans, mortgages and consumer credit).
3  Starting at close to zero in 1983, by the 
end of 2001, asset-backed securities accounted for 40% of what had previously been 
credit held on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries.
4  This shift from bank to 
marketable debt is important for two reasons. It makes financing more flexible in 
response to external shocks, and it makes banks less important.  The following example 
demonstrates what has happened.  During the winter of 2001 as the U.S. economy 
slowed, the credit-rating agencies downgraded the large automobile manufacturers, 
increasing their borrowing costs.  Since the demand for cars was falling, this was 
potentially disastrous.  How were Ford, GM and DaimlerChrysler going to offer the 
financial incentives needed to move the cars off of the dealers’ lots?  Without high credit 
ratings, it was too expensive for them to borrow directly and make the loans that were 
needed to sell the cars.  And yet, in the fall of 2001 automobile sales hit records highs, as 
buyers were offered very attractive loans to purchase the cars.  How did they do it?  The 
answer is that the car companies created pools of car loans and securitized them.  These 
car-loan-backed securities had better credit ratings – they were AAA – than the car 
companies themselves!
5   
 
  This new financial intermediation – through asset-backed securities – gives us all 
direct access to capital markets.  By finding a broker who will put me into a pool, I now 
have direct access to capital markets, and no longer have to rely on a bank. The broker 
takes a fee for this service, but I don’t need to worry about the availability of bank credit.  
Not only that, but I don’t have to know it is happening to me, nor do I care! 
 
These three changes – improved inventory control policies, the rise in the use of 
temporary help and the increase in the percentage of lending that is marketable – have 
                                                 
3 The data are from the Federal Reserve’s Flow and Funds. The numerator of the series is Table L125 line 1 
plus L126 line 1, financial assets of federally related mortgage pools plus financial assets of private issuers 
of asset-backed securities.  The denominator is the sum of lines 6, 7, 8 and 9 from Table L4, credit market 
debt included bank loans not elsewhere classified, other loans and advances, mortgages and consumer 
credit. 
4 Estrella (forthcoming) provides a summary of the increase in asset-backed securities and its likely impact 
on monetary policy effectiveness. 
5 See Greg Ip and Russell Gold “ Shock Absorbers: Lessons of Expansion Are Helping Economy Beat 
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each played a part in the improved performance of the U.S. economy.  They have made 
the economy more flexible in responding to unexpected events. 
 
2.2 A Faster Growing Economy 
 
Turning to the increase in the level of U.S. growth, the first line of Table 1 gives 
us a sense of what happened over the last quarter of the twentieth century.  The table 
shows raw average annual growth in business nonfarm output for the periods 1974 to 
1990, 1991 to 1995, and 1996 to 1999.
6  Growth in the last half of the 1990s was truly 
extraordinary.  The increase over the first five years of the decade is in excess of two full 
percentage points at an annual rate.   
   
  By the end of the 1990s a consensus had developed that the sustainable growth 
rate of the U.S. economy had reached at least 4 percent.  That is, with the unemployment 
rate steady, American GDP could grow at a rate that is now 1½-percentage points higher 
than it could only five years ago.  Labor productivity growth had risen by the same 1½ -
percentage points and was rising at a rate of at least 3 % per year.
7 
 
  What were the sources of this astonishing performance of the U.S. economy in the 
latter half of the 1990s?  To get some idea we can turn to the Ohliner and Sichel’s (2000) 
estimates of the sources of growth, reproduced in Table 1.  From their accounting we 
learn that that the 2-percentage point rise in U.S. growth had three primary sources: 
higher labor inputs, higher investment in information technology capital, and increases in 
multifactor productivity. The increase in labor inputs mirrored the decline in the U.S. 
unemployment rate from over 5½% in 1995 to 4% five years later.  What is most striking 
is the importance that Ohliner and Sichel ascribe to the increase in IT investment.  By 
their estimates, IT investment alone accounted for 0.54 of the 2.08 percentage point rise 
in growth, fully one-quarter of the increase in growth. Increased multifactor productivity 
growth accounts for 0.7 percentage points of the remaining change.  This is the part of the 
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change that is left unexplained by standard growth accounting.  There are a number of 
possible interpretations of this increase, one of which is that it represents the increased 
productivity arising from the efficient use of technology in production.
8 
 
  It is worth looking at the IT data a bit more closely. Table 2 reports that, between 
the first and second half of the 1990s, the growth rate in computer hardware inputs 
increased from an already impressive 29% to a phenomenal average annual growth rate 
of 46%. As a simple matter of accounting, this acceleration in equipment installation is 
responsible for all of the increase in productivity growth attributed to information 
technology.   
 
Digging deeper, we see that the increased growth in computer equipment 
investment came from the intensification in the U.S. of computer price declines during 
this period.  The deflator for information technology equipment used by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) to calculate U.S. GDP went from an average of about -15% in 
the first half of the decade of the 1990s to an average of nearly -25% in the second half.  
If, from 1995 to 1999, the hardware deflator had continued to decline at the more modest 
-15% rate, then U.S. growth would have averaged between 0.25 and 0.50 percentage 
points less than it was.
9 The clear implication is that a significant share of the increase in 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 At this writing in early 2002, disagreements had resurfaced and estimates of the sustainable growth rate 
ranged from 3 to 4 percent.  
8 Before continuing, it is worth pointing out that Robert Gordon has looked at these same numbers and 
come to somewhat different conclusions. Gordon makes two points.  First, he notes that evaluation of the 
changes in the productivity trend requires careful treatment of cyclical factors.  From this he concludes that 
this accounts for part, but not all of the acceleration of the late 1990s.  Second, Gordon’s analysis shows 
that the productivity growth increase is concentrated in the durable manufacturing sector.  That is, the 
improvement in productive efficiency has not been shared across the entire economy, but has been entirely 
in less than one-tenth of the economy (measured by employment).  See Gordon (2000). 
9 It is important to note that in the U.S., the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) employs hedonic 
adjustments, which incorporate improvements in processing speed and memory, for example, directly into 
the construction of price indices.  Furthermore, because these adjustments have become more important in 
recent years and they are not made in most European countries, the differences have increased. During the 
first half of the 1990s German and U.S. computer price deflators showed roughly equivalent declines.  It is 
over the past five years that the two have diverged significantly, with the German deflator showing a 
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the American productivity growth rate is a consequence of measured improvements in the 
quality of computer hardware installed by businesses.
10   
 
  Before turning to the recent inflation record, it is worth digressing briefly to bring 
up the possibility that we are overinvesting in information technology equipment.  After 
the Nasdaq finished its slow motion crash in mid-2001, newspapers and magazines were 
cluttered with pictures of surplus computers piled in warehouses.  This “refuse” came 
from bankrupt internet companies that had been able to obtain financing because of the 
bubble in the Nasdaq.  Because it was too cheap to obtain financing, the economy 
invested too heavily in computers.  Since investment in IT equipment was so big a part of 
the new economy productivity acceleration, if it was unjustified then the measured 
increase in growth was a mirage.  
 
  Overinvestment in IT equipment may be more than just a one-time problem 
arising from a stock “bubble”.  The possibility comes from what I think of as the dark 
side of network externalities.  A network externality arises when the usefulness of a 
product to you depends on how many other people have it.  If you have the only fax 
machine, it is useless.  But if everyone has a fax machine, that is a different story.  The 
same is true of computer software.  I am typing this document using Microsoft Word 
2000 version 9.0.3821 SR-1.  I don’t really know what all of that means, but I do know 
that if I send the document to someone using a sufficiently antiquated version of 
Microsoft Word that this document will not display or print properly.  In other words, to 
take advantage of the network externality that comes from using this word processing 
software, we all have to keep our software sufficiently up to date. This means more than 
buying updates. As we have all learned, updates are designed to run on the newest, 
fastest, more memory-intensive, machines and so the upgrading of the software often 
forces us to buy new hardware quite frequently – probably more frequently than we really 
need!   
                                                 
10 I have argued elsewhere that the computers generate monopoly rents for the producers that need not be 
shared with the users, and so the economic benefits generally may accrue to the individuals (and countries) 
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I believe the GDP numbers produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, but if 
we are replacing our computers too frequently investment and growth may be 
overestimated.  This will show up mainly in the price deflator, as the true quality of 
computers may not be increasing as fast as the official estimates suggest. 
 
2.3 Lower Inflation 
 
  Beyond the increase in productivity growth, a second important aspect of recent 
experience in the U.S. has been the behavior of inflation.  Through the latter half of the 
1990s, inflation in the U.S. was both low and falling. 
   
   Chart 6 plots the 12-month changes in headline inflation as measured by the All-
Items Consumer Price Index (CPI) and two measures of core inflation, the CPI excluding 
food and energy, and the Median CPI.
11  Inflation in the U.S. dropped steadily throughout 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, hitting a low in 1999.  But the most striking fact about this 
picture is the pattern over the latter part of the 1990s.  Here we see that both the headline 
CPI and the two core measures actually fell as growth was rising. During this entire 
period, the vast majority of analysts inside and outside of the government were 
forecasting that inflation would be one-half to one percentage point higher than it turned 
out to be.  Only in the last 12 to 18 months has inflation begun to rise to levels in excess 
of 2½%. 
 
  How can we account for the recent inflation experience?  There are several 
explanations.  The most obvious is that in the late 1990s, the U.S. economy experienced 
two beneficial supply shocks that reduced inflation.  These came in the form of the 
restructuring of the system for the delivery of medical care and the reduction of oil prices.  
Chart 7 reports the 12-month change in the consumer price index for medical care 
commodities and services.  As the data clearly show, inflation in medical costs declined 
                                                                                                                                                 
productivity will flow to the computer makers, and second that the productivity growth increases will 
accrue to the countries that produce computers. 
11 The Median CPI is computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and is available on their web 
site, http://www.clev.frb.org/Research/index.htm#cpi.  The computation is based on work that first 
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significantly throughout the 1990s, falling from nearly 10% at the beginning of the 
decade to a low of 2½% in late 1997.  But through the latter half of the 1990s, medical 
care cost inflation remained below 4% per year. 
 
  Turning to oil prices, Chart 8 reports the price level of West Texas Intermediate 
crude oil.  Through 1998, oil prices fell from $25 per barrel at the beginning of the year, 
to a low of just over $10 by the end of the year.  This significant reduction in energy 
prices had a clearly beneficial effect on the U.S. economy, helping to both raise growth 
and lower inflation.    
 
  Has the advance of information technology changed the inflation process itself?  
While its possible to argue that the product markets have become more competitive, as it 
is now easier to sample the prices of many suppliers at lower cost, there is no reason to 
believe that inflation has changed in any material way.   The internet, and the low cost of 
communicating prices to potential customers has certainly improved the efficient 
operation of the price system in allocating resources, but it has not changed the way in 
which overall price inflation occurs.  The new economy has affected inflation in the same 
way that it has influenced output – by making short- and medium-term forecasting more 
difficult.  The difficulty in forecasting inflation and growth over the medium term is the 
primary challenge for policymakers posed by the new economy for monetary 
policymakers, and I take that up next. 
  
3. Macroeconomic Policy in the New Economy 
 
The two pillars of modern macroeconomic policy are the government’s tax and 
expenditure decisions and the determination of short-term interest rates by the central 
bank.  In the past we have thought of fiscal and monetary policy as sharing responsibility 
for short-term stabilization and having somewhat different roles in insuring long-term 
growth. Does the new economy imply a new macroeconomic policy as well?   Things 
have certainly changed.  Let’s see how. 
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3.1 Fiscal Policy 
 
Over the past 50 years we have come to think of fiscal policy as an important 
source of stimulus during a general slowdown. People turn to their elected officials for 
help, demanding that they set things right with new programs that bring some 
combination of lower taxes and higher government spending.   Payments to the 
unemployed and lower income tax bills create a social safety net that automatically 
stabilizes modern market-based economics.  We believe that this reduces the overall 
amplitude of cyclical downturns while at the same time insuring that the burden is not 
overly concentrated on the unlucky few.  
 
But when things start going bad, the natural reaction is to want to do something, 
and in the fiscal arena that means discretionary tax and expenditure programs tailor-made 
for the problem at hand.  These can work. But just because something can work, it does 
not follow automatically that it will or that it is the right thing to do. There have always 
been flaws with discretionary fiscal policy, and the more flexible goods, labor and 
financial markets of the new economy have only made these worse.  The problem is that 
fiscal policy is both slow and hard to do sensibly. Look at a few facts.  
 
Most recessions are short, lasting a year or less. The longest recession in the US 
after the Second World War lasted 16 months. Furthermore, because data are only 
available with several months lag, a recession is often half way through before there is 
consensus that a recession has started.  
 
Timing presents a considerable challenge. I know of no government that has an 
agreed-upon economic stimulus legislation waiting to be implemented. In fact, given both 
the shifting environment and the changing cast of characters, such a thing is both 
economically undesirable and politically inconceivable. Instead, someone has to write 
new legislation every time a recession comes along. This takes several months even 
under the best of circumstances. The most recent example is instructive. Serious Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 13 
Congressional efforts to pass stimulus legislation in 2001 began only after September 11, 
six months after the recession “officially” started,
 12 and were completed in early March 
2002, when economic recovery was already underway.
13 
 
As if that were not enough, policies take time to have any impact. Even after 
legislative action is complete, changes in taxes do not increase individual consumption or 
corporate investment immediately. By the time the spending starts, the chances are the 
coming boom will be in full swing.  
 
The main problem is with the substance of economic stimulus packages. 
Economists do not write economic stimulus packages, politicians do!  And fiscal stimulus 
is one place where economics and politics collide. Economists prefer policies that focus 
attention on getting a few important people to do something they were not planning to do 
while avoiding paying for others to do what they would have done anyway. Temporary 
incentives to spur investment and income tax reductions for the less well off who will 
spend what they get are good examples. Politicians, by contrast, look for programs that 
reward the largest number of people possible in order to win support and ensure re-
election.  
 
The Bush administration's decision in 2001-2002 to try to sell a capital gains tax 
reduction as part of their anti-recession program is a particularly egregious example of an 
expensive proposal that will have virtually no impact on the problem at hand. I guess 
reducing the tax burden on some wealthy people when they chose to sell appreciated 
stock might lead them to buy a few more Mercedes and BMWs, but I’m not exactly sure 
what it has to do improving the prospects for short-run economic growth. The proposal to 
cut the taxes big companies pay on past profits is another example.  I do not hold 
opportunism against elected public officials, but we all need to recognize that it exists. 
We elect politicians to do things that are popular. Economic slowdowns, when some 
people are suffering and the rest are worried, play to their worst instincts. 
                                                 
12 The official arbiter of recessions, the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, could have easily picked 
an early beginning for the recession, as employment and production seem to have peaked in late 2000.  Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 14 
The fact that the economy has become more flexible in adjusting to shocks has 
made all of these problems worse.  To the extent the economy’s natural recuperative 
powers are improved, there is now even less time to get the job done. This increases the 
odds that any legislatively-based stimulus program will come on line too late to do what 
was intended.   Add to this the fact that markets, through mechanisms like asset-backed-
securities and temporary help, have made it easier to circumvent roadblocks put up by 
governments trying to distort economic incentives, and many things look even more 
pointless. 
 
All of this means that discretionary fiscal policy is a poor stabilization tool. While 
it might be possible to design economically sensible stimulus legislation, we need to 
realize that it will not be enacted.  Instead, legislators should focus their attention on 
building solid foundations for long-term growth. This means creating structural tax and 
spending policies that encourage investment, innovation and hard work.  Eliminating the 
corporate income tax and the individual tax on capital gains may be good long-term 
policy actions, but that is what should be debated.  In the meantime, the new economy 
has made fiscal policy an even worse stabilization tool than it was a decade ago. 
  
3.2 Central Bank Policy 
 
  The changes wrought by the advances of the last decade pose both immediate and 
long-run challenges for the operations of central banks.  In the short term, these are really 
just the same old problems that monetary policymakers have faced for decades: 
stabilization requires distinguishing transitory from permanent shifts in productivity 
growth.  The long-term threat is rather different.  There, central banks are threatened by 
the possibility that the disappearance of the demand for the monetary base – the thing 
only they can supply – will render their policy tools impotent.  We will consider each of 
these in turn. 
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Immediate Challenges 
 
  The objective of most of the central banks of the world is to stabilize inflation 
about some low level while maintaining growth at near its sustainable rate.  One way of 
expressing this is that monetary policy seeks to minimize a weighted average of inflation 
and output variability.  Variability is usually measured as the squared deviation from the 
target.  In the case of inflation, there is general agreement that target levels should be in 
the range of zero to two percent per year. The exact value depends on a number of 
considerations that are likely to be unique to the conditions within the region that the 
central bank operates as well as the manner in which inflation is measured.
14  The 
problem is the target for output, where policymakers require an estimate of the 
sustainable rate of growth, or potential output.  
 
  In practical terms, the difficulty is that central bankers should react differently to 
transitory movements in productivity than to permanent ones.  If a productivity shock is 
transitory, then policymakers will attempt to stabilize output about its permanent growth 
path, allowing prices to deviate somewhat from their long-run target path.  By contrast, if 
productivity growth shifts permanently, then the appropriate policy response is to 
stabilize inflation while allowing output to move to its new long-run growth path. 
 
Telling the difference between changes in productivity growth that are temporary 
and those that are not has proven to be extremely difficult. To see the point, first look 
back to Chart 2 where I have plotted output per hour in the nonfarm business sector and 
ask how long it would take to tell that the second half of the 1990s is different from the 
first half.   In hindsight we can see it.  But to do their job, the FOMC needed to divine 
this change in 1997!  Our good fortune is that they were able to see the productivity 
acceleration in its early stages. 
 
  Private sector economists as a group failed to realize that the sustainable growth 
rate of the economy had risen.  Chart 9 is a plot of the log of GDP together with a series 
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of consensus forecasts from the Blue Chip survey.  For each quarter, the chart shows the 
forecast out several years. For example, for the first quarter of 1996, I plot the actual data 
point, plus the forecast for the next few years.  The actual level of GDP follows a path 
that is steeper than the forecasts throughout the period, meaning that the forecasters 
consistently underestimated growth.  The systematic underestimates of the growth rates 
were a clear sign that forecasters were slow to learn that a significant part of the 
productivity acceleration was permanent. 
 
  The continuous underestimates of GDP growth were accompanied by a series of 
overestimates of future inflation.  Chart 10 plots the log of the consumer price index 
together with the series of forecasts.   Until oil prices began to rise in early 1999, 
professional forecasters were consistently overestimating future levels of inflation. (Core 
inflation forecast errors continued to be positive through the end of the decade.)  
Interestingly, the combination of the real GDP and inflation forecast errors suggest that 
forecasts of nominal GDP were approximately correct. 
 
  It is interesting to note that if we were to collect data for the latter half of the 
1970s, we would be able to produce very similar charts, although the labels would be 
switched.  That is, forecasts of GDP would have been consistently too high, and forecasts 
of inflation would have been systematically too low. 
 
   But the problem of estimating trend growth extends beyond the tumultuous 
periods of the late 1970s and late 1990s.  Athanasios Orphanides (1998) has compared 
real time estimates (i.e. those used by a putative inflation forecaster) for 1980 to 1992 of 
the output gap in the United States with subsequent revisions, and arrives at astonishing 
conclusions. During this period, the real time estimates of the gap (measured as output 
minus potential output divided by potential) averaged -3.99 % with a standard deviation 
of 3.46. Subsequent revisions in measures of both actual and potential output led to 
changes in the estimated gap such that by 1994 the revised figures for the 1980-1992 
period implied a gap of only -1.64 % with a standard deviation of 2.44!  In other words 
the revised gap was on average 2.35 percentage points lower than the real time estimates, Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 17 
which presumably were used in the preparation of inflation forecasts and as inputs into 
the formulation of monetary policy at the time. 
 
  Turning to monetary policy, we can look to the work of Jordi Galí to help us to 
understand the challenges posed by shifts in trend productivity. Galí (2000) compares the 
behavior of inflation following a move in productivity in the Volcker-Greenspan period 
(1979-1999) with that in the pre-Volcker (1954-1979) period.  He finds that during the 
1980s and 1990s, a negative productivity shock left inflation unchanged, while in the 
earlier period, inflation rose significantly.  The explanation for this is that the FOMC of 
the 1960s and 1970s did a poor job of distinguishing transitory from permanent changes 
in growth, and tried to keep a decline in productivity from affecting output. The result 
was inflation.  In the more recent period, with an increased focus on inflation, the FOMC 
has not made the same mistakes. 
 
  Overall, the message is clear.  During periods when the productivity growth trend 
is changing, central bankers face challenges that are more daunting than the usual ones.  
Failing to react to a decline in productivity growth, as the U.S. did in the 1970s, can 
result in an extended episode of higher than desired inflation, which is then costly to 
eliminate.  Alternatively, a central bank that tightens policy when faced with a permanent 
increase in its economy’s sustainable rate of growth risks not allowing the growth to 
occur in the first place.  In the end, though, the challenge is to figure out as quickly and 





While technological progress poses clear short-run and medium-run challenges 
for monetary policy, they can all be studied and discussed using the now common 
                                                 
15 It is interesting to note that the debate over the distribution of increased U.S. growth between its 
permanent and transitory components continues in the form of trying to cyclically adjust productivity.  
Robert Gordon (2000) suggested that a significant part of the acceleration has been cyclical. As we emerge 
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vocabulary of central bankers. We talk about the impact of the change in an interest rate 
instrument on output and inflation as transmitted through the financial system.    
 
But when we think about the long-run challenges posed by technological advance, 
we must think critically about the nature in which the transmission mechanism will 
change.  Will the central bank continue to be able to control an interest rate? How will 
they do it?  What will the consequences of changes in the system of financial 
intermediation be for system stability?
16 
  
These are all difficult questions, and they have elicited a variety of answers over 
the past few years.  At the heart of the issue is whether technological advance will 
ultimately eliminate completely the private sector demand for central bank liabilities.  
Today, this demand is split between two groups.  First, there is the demand for currency 
to be used in daily transactions by individuals, and second, financial intermediaries 
demand reserves for their daily clearing operations through the payments system that is 
maintained by the central bank.  In some countries, intermediaries hold reserves to meet 
regulatory requirements, but in most instances, this demand is being eliminated by 
technological advance and so I will ignore it here.
17  
 
  Monetary policy operates by adjusting the level of the central bank's liabilities. If 
the demand for these liabilities goes to zero, then the leverage of policymakers will 
disappear as well.  But is the time approaching when individuals will no longer hold 
currency and financial firms will no longer hold central bank reserves?  Let us take each 
of these in turn. 
 
  First, consider the demand for currency.  The claim is that privately issued store-
value cards and the like will replace the functions of officially issued paper money.  
                                                 
16 These questions are in addition to the ones raised by the change in the financial intermediation system. 
Estrella (forthcoming) discusses how the increase in securitization has decreased the effectiveness of 
monetary policy.  He estimates a rather dramatic decline in the interest elasticity of GDP growth. 
17 The U.S. is a case in point, where very few banks are bound by their reserve requirements. Regional 
banks hold ATM cash and money center banks hold clearing balances in the Federal Reserve accounts that 
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Currency provides finality, security, and anonymity in transactions. Surely, we will want 
all of these and so any adequate substitutes will need to have all of these characteristics.  
It is difficult to conceive of privately issued substitutes with all of these. Specifically, the 
risk-free nature of central bank liabilities is something that private money will have a 
very difficult time emulating. 
 
  To see the point, think of the example of stored-value cards issued by a telephone 
company.  These exist in many countries, are easy to purchase, and convenient to use.  
The cards have value because they can be exchanged for phone-company provided 
services, something that is in nearly universal demand. 
 
   Can we imagine the cards, or their electronic equivalent, replacing central bank 
liabilities in the payment and settlement of transactions? There are several reasons to be 
skeptical.  First, there is the fact that the government is unlikely to accept payment of 
taxes in telephone company liabilities.  This alone is probably enough to sustain the 
existence of central bank money.  But beyond that, there is the fact that the probability of 
phone company default is likely substantially higher than that of the central bank.   
  But even in the absence of actual default, the phone company can partially default 
by inflating the price of its services. This possibility means that it is unlikely that phone 
company "money" will always trade at par.
18 Central bank money has no such problem.  
The central bank can always guarantee that a dollar is one dollar.   
 
  In fact, the private issuer need not actually threaten bankruptcy to partially default 
on its liabilities.  If, as in the case of the phone company, the "money" is backed by 
services rendered by the issuer, then raising the price of the services is partial default on 
the nominal value of the money.  While central banks surely have defaulted on the value 
of their liabilities through aggregate inflation, a credible commitment to price stability is 
now the norm. 
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  Information technology may well eliminate demand for central bank issued paper 
currency.  But if the central bank adapts and issues e-money, then the official e-money 
seems very likely to dominate that of all private issuers.   
 
  It is worth pausing to comment on the demand for cash for illegal and 
underground transactions. Some people have noted that so long as this demand remains, 
monetary policy will retain its efficacy.  But if the only remaining demand for currency 
were to come from drug dealers and the Mafia, surely we would all agree that the proper 
policy response would be to eliminate its issuance. 
 
  This brings us to the demand for central bank reserves used in the payments 
system.  We have already reached the point in most central bank systems where the intra-
day demand far exceeds the overnight demand for these balances.  In the U.S., for 
example, the overnight level of clearing balances is now well below $10 billion. 
Meanwhile, the gross level of daily transactions on the Fedwire exceeds $2 trillion.  
During any given day, cumulative overdrafts of banks that are executing these clearings 
can easily exceed $40 billion at any given instant.  The overdrafts arise from the timing 
mismatch of incoming and outgoing payments at the largest banks, and attract a charge of 
less than 50 basis points at an annual rate (measured by the minute).  But the point is that 
this system is very heavily used, and it runs largely on intra-day credit. 
 
  The details of these payments systems, including charges for intra-day credit and 
remuneration for overnight balances, differ.  But several things look as if they are similar. 
In particular, the payments system run by the central bank usually entails some form of 
subsidization.  This can be in the form of the provision of intra-day credit, or the implicit 
guarantees, or the network externalities of letting everyone connect for a nominal (or 
zero) charge.  Given the existence of the central bank's payment system and the use of 
central bank liabilities in clearing, it seems that the demand for reserves is likely to 
continue long into the future.  Since the leverage of monetary policy is a consequence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 If you believe that this is far-fetched, consider the example of the California energy utility Pacific, Gas 
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the central bank being the monopoly supplier of these reserves, my prediction is that the 




The rapid advance of information and communication technology has brought 
with it changes in virtually every sector of the economy.  This new economy is growing 
more quickly and is more stable than the old one. I have argued that these changes have 
been the result of a series of changes to the structure of production, labor markets and 
financial intermediation.  Using new ideas and technologies, firms are now able to 
manage their inventories of goods more accurately and so need less of them, temporary 
workers increase the flexibility of the labor force, and the increased reliance on asset-
backed securities to finance credit has made us less dependent on banks.   
 
The improved recuperative powers of the new economy mean that policymakers 
must change the way that they do their jobs.  I have argued that fiscal policy, never a 
particularly good stabilization tool, should now focus exclusively on providing a 
foundation for long-term stable growth. The job of short-term policy adjustments should 
be left to central bankers.  They are not only independent from the political 
considerations that make it difficult for legislators to do the right thing, but they can 
respond quickly to changed economic conditions. But I have emphasized that the New 
Economy poses particularly difficult challenges for monetary policymakers for several 
reasons.  First, the changes in the financial sector may well have blunted the impact of 
monetary policy. Interest rate changes affect growth and inflation through the banking 
system.  As banks have become less relevant to credit creation, monetary policy may well 
have become less effective.  The second challenge comes from the fact that it appears to 
have become more difficult to differentiate between transitory and permanent shifts in 
productivity growth.  When the trend is shifting around, as it has been for some years 
now, historical patterns are a poor guide to the future making a central banker’s job even 
more difficult.  It is worth noting that to the extent that structural changes have made the 
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economy more stable, monetary policy is less important than it once was – and the risks 
from policy mistakes are also smaller.   
 
In considering the long-run impact of information and communication technology 
on monetary policy, the concern is over the potential disappearance of the demand for 
central bank liabilities.  Since monetary policy acts through changes in the quantity and 
interest rate charged for central bank liabilities, if the demand evaporates, monetary 
policy goes with it.  My conclusion is that perfect substitutes for all of the functions of 
central bank money are extremely unlikely to arise, and so the central bank will retain 
some leverage.   
 
We can only hope that each new day continues to bring with it a new economy 
and that the challenges of the future are as pleasant as those of the recent past have been.Cecchetti  The New Economy and the Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 23 
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Table 1: Contributions to Growth of Real Nonfarm Business Output, 
1974 to 1999 
 
 1974-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Growth of Output  3.13  2.82  4.90 
 
Contributions from      
Information Technology  0.51  0.54  1.08 
     Hardware  0.28 0.24  0.62 
     Software  0.11 0.23  0.31 
     Communications 
         Equipment  0.12 0.07  0.15 
Other Capital  0.85  0.44  0.76 
Labor Hours  1.15  0.82  1.51 
Labor Quality  0.22  0.44  0.31 
Multifactor Productivity  0.44  0.57  1.25 
 
Growth Rate of Inputs      
     Hardware  31.4  17.5  36.0 
     Software  13.2  12.8  13.1 
     Communications 
         Equipment  7.7 3.6  7.1 
Source:  Ohliner, Stephen D. and Daniel E. Sichel, “The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s:   
Is Information Technology the Story?”  February 2000.   
 
Table 2 
The Change in the 1990s 
(Average Annual Percentage Growth) 
     1991-1995   1996-1999 
Nonfinancial Corporate Business 
Labor Productivity         1.61        3.55 
Unit Labor Costs        1.36             0.52 
Unit Non-Labor Costs       0.75       -0.50 
 
Real Investment in  
Computer Hardware
*        29.0        45.9 
 
Prices of Computer Hardware     -14.8      -23.4 
 
*National Income and Product Accounts Basis. 
 Source:  U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts 
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Chart 9: Blue Chip Forecasts of 








































Chart 10: Blue Chip Forecasts 
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